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ABSTRACT
To practise ’fairly and justly’ a clinician must balance 
the needs of both the many and the few: the individual 
patient in front of them, and the many unseen patients in 
the waiting room, and in the county. They must consider 
the immediate clinical needs of those in the present, 
and how their actions will impact on future patients. The 
good medical practice guidance ’Make the care of your 
patient your first concern’ provides no guidance on how 
doctors should act when they care for multiple patients 
with conflicting needs. Moreover, conflicting needs 
extend far past simply those between different patients. 
At an organisational level, financial obligations must be 
balanced with clinical ones; the system must support 
those who work within it in a variety of roles; and, finally, 
in order for a healthcare service to be sustainable, the 
demands of current and future generations must be 
balanced.
The central problem, we propose, is that there is no 
shared philosophical framework on which the provision 
of care or the development of health policy is based, 
nor is there a practical, fair and transparent process to 
ensure that the service is equipped to deal justly with 
new challenges as they emerge. Many philosophers have 
grappled with constructing a set of principles which 
would lead to a ’good’ society which is just to different 
users; prominent among them is Rawls.
Four important principles can be derived using a 
Rawlsian approach: equity of access, distributive justice, 
sustainability and openness. However, Rawls’ approach is 
sometimes considered too abstract to be applied readily 
to policymaking; it does not provide clear guidance for 
how individuals working within existing institutions can 
enact the principles of justice. We therefore combine 
the principles derived from Rawls with Scanlonian 
contractualism: by demanding that decisions are made in 
a way which cannot be ’reasonably rejected’ by different 
stakeholders (including ’trustees’ for those who cannot 
represent themselves), we ensure that conflicting needs 
are considered robustly.
We demonstrate how embedding this framework would 
ensure just policies and fair practice. We illustrate 
this by using examples of how it would help prevent 
injustice among different socioeconomic groups, prevent 
intergenerational injustice and prevent injustice in a 
crisis, for example, as we respond to new challenges such 
as COVID-19.
Attempts to help individual doctors practise fairly 
and justly throughout their professional lives are 
best focused at an institutional or systemic level. We 
propose a practical framework: combining Scanlonian 
contractualism with a Rawlsian approach. Adopting this 
framework would equip the workforce and population 
to contribute to fair policymaking, and would ultimately 
result in a healthcare system whose practice and 
policies—at their core—were just.
INTRODUCTION
Healthcare systems face ‘competing, and sometimes 
conflicting, demands’1; resolving conflicts fairly 
between groups with differing priorities presents 
a significant challenge. The good medical practice 
guidance ‘Make the care of your patient your first 
concern’2 provides no guidance on how doctors 
should act when they care for multiple patients 
with conflicting needs.3 Conflicts are not always a 
matter of resource allocation—issues surrounding 
how services are structured, how staff are treated 
and how information is shared can also be sources 
of tension.
To address these conflicts, ethical guidance has 
been drawn up to offer at best help and, at worst, 
post hoc justification for policymakers. Often 
ethical goals (eg, treating people fairly) are elided 
with executive virtues (eg, being flexible). The 
central problem, we propose, is that there is no 
shared philosophical framework on which the provi-
sion of care or the development of health policy is 
based, nor is there a practical, fair and transparent 
process to ensure that the service is equipped to deal 
justly with new challenges as they emerge.
Perhaps because of this, there are many examples 
where current practice is unjust at local, regional, 
national and intergenerational levels. Take the 
recent response to COVID-19, which saw prioriti-
sation of those being treated and working in acute 
care over those in primary care and care homes. 
Look at discrepancies in accessing care (and infor-
mation about care) between those in different 
socioeconomic groups, even within the same 
region. Consider the depleted workforce which 
future patients will face because of poor investment 
in maintaining our nurses and doctors.
We believe that to achieve justice and fairness 
in practice and policy, a philosophical framework 
must be made explicit, in particular to help guide 
the development of principles which treat groups 
with different demands fairly. We believe that if we 
develop and embed such a framework for policy 
decisions, then the individual decisions which clini-
cians make on a day- to- day basis will also become 
fairer and cause less moral discomfort. If the process 
for considering and weighing conflicting demands 
is fair, then the resulting outcomes will be just.
Many philosophers have grappled with 
constructing a generalisable set of principles which 
would lead to a ‘good’ society which is just to 
different users, notably John Rawls.4–6 While his 
theory has previously been rejected as being useful 
in resolving individual issues in healthcare,7 we 
have argued that it can provide a useful framework 
for making policy decisions, guiding how a just 
health service should be constructed and sustained.8 
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Daniels has also previously drawn on Rawls: he argued, in ‘Just 
Health’, that resource allocation decisions can be made fair by 
ensuring that they are public, relevant, amenable to appeals and 
that the process is regulated.9 Badano argued that the ‘relevant’ 
condition rendered this process too unfair for individuals, whose 
interests are sacrificed for the sake of groups.10 We note it also 
fails to recognise the importance of intergenerational justice. 
Like Daniels, we argue that Rawls can be used as an example 
of procedural justice to make healthcare decision- making more 
just; we extend Daniels’ argument (which centres on how 
resources can be allocated) to other aspects of healthcare policy, 
to fairly balance the needs of a range of users in this, and future, 
generations.
There is a significant challenge in creating a framework which 
is philosophically robust, yet easily accessible to politicians and 
clinicians, and which can be fairly applied to create just health-
care policies. In this essay, we will demonstrate how this can 
be done by combining Scanlonian contractualism with explicit 
principles derived from a Rawlsian framework.
First, for those unfamiliar with it, we will summarise Rawls’ 
Theory of Justice and the principles which emerge from it, and 
discuss how it could be used as a philosophical framework to 
guide the development of a just healthcare system. We will then 
consider practical difficulties with implementing this Rawlsian 
approach, and examine the benefits (and problems) of using 
Scanlonian contractualism as an alternative. We will explore how 
combining a Rawlsian framework with elements of Scanlonian 
contractualism could helpfully guide decision- making within 
the National Health Service (NHS) as it stands. Finally, we will 
illustrate, with examples, how this might be used to approach 
conflicting demands facing the health service.
A RAWLSIAN APPROACH FOR THE HEALTH SERVICE
John Rawls’ ‘Theory of Justice’ aims to determine a set of princi-
ples which, if followed, will give rise to a just basic structure for 
society.4 Rawls imagines people in what he terms the ‘original 
position’, where they are behind a veil of ignorance. Behind the 
‘veil’, people do not know what their position in society will 
be—they are ignorant as to their race, gender, wealth, natural 
endowments and religious/political convictions.4 Rawls asks 
what principles ‘free and rational persons concerned to further 
their own interests’ would agree to from this position. People in 
this conception are ‘capable of reasonableness’, and will act on 
whatever principles are agreed to. The terms that such agents 
would agree to from behind the veil are, by virtue of their agree-
ment alone, just. Rawls uses the phrase ‘justice as fairness’ to 
reflect this principle: it ‘conveys the idea that the principles of 
justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair’,4 https://
www. gov. uk/ government/ groups/ moral- and- ethical- advisory- 
group# meeting- summaries
Rawls argues that, by using this procedure, two main princi-
ples of justice would emerge:
1. All persons should have equal basic liberties.
2. Social and economic inequalities (of ‘primary goodsi’) need 
to satisfy two conditions:
 – They should be attached to positions/offices open to all 
under fair equality of opportunity.
i Rawls says, ‘Primary social goods are things which it is suppose 
a rational man wants whatever else he wants… The primary 
social goods, to give them in broad categories, are rights, liber-
ties, and opportunities, and income and wealth. ([and]A very 
important primary good is a sense of one’s own worth)’ (p 79, 
The Theory of Justice).
 – Primary goods should be distributed equally, unless an 
unequal distribution would be to everyone’s—and in par-
ticular the worst- off ’s—advantage (known as the ‘differ-
ence principle’).
Rawls addresses intergenerational justice by making people 
in the original position ignorant to the position that their own 
generation holds in the timeline of generations. Someone behind 
this version of the veil would not agree to a system in which early 
generations are able to use resources at an unsustainable rate, to 
protect themselves from the possibility of being in a much later 
generation with a paucity of resources. Yet they would also not 
agree to a system where early generations are forced to be so 
frugal with resources that they cannot make use of them at all. 
Rawls terms this balance the ‘just savings principle’, which he 
describes as ‘an understanding between generations to carry their 
fair share of the burden of realizing and preserving a just society’.4 
The difference principle determines distributive justice within 
one generation, while the just savings principle determines 
resource distribution between generations. The just savings prin-
ciple thus constrains the difference principle, and emphasises 
that people have a duty to create a system which permits the 
realisation and maintenance of a just basic structure over time.6
We previously applied this approach to healthcare and asked 
what a health service would look like if those making poli-
cies did not know if they were a patient, healthcare worker or 
manager—in this generation or the next.8 We concluded that its 
basic structure would bear similarities to the NHS as it currently 
exists (it would provide comprehensive services which are free at 
the point of need) but it would not be identical. Two important 
general principles emerge in addition to equity of access; we 
believe that articulating and emphasising these in policymaking 
would lead to a more just health service.
First, in considering examples where the immediate needs of 
individuals conflict with the future needs, it is clear that there is 
a strong requirement for a healthcare service which is sustain-
able (in its training and treatment of staff, and in encouraging 
research). Second, increased openness is required: since power 
and opportunities are primary goods, individuals—both health-
care professionals and the public—should have the opportu-
nity to exert some power over the system which provides their 
healthcare. The system must thus be open in terms of its trans-
parency of decision- making to patients and staff, and account-
able in terms of the individuals and organisations which make 
decisions about the running of the health service.
The process of applying a Rawlsian analysis to the health 
service could provide a normative basis for the principles that 
would best guide the development of a just health service. 
As demonstrated in figure 1, four important principles can 
be derived: equity of access, the difference principle, the just 
savings principle and openness.
It is important to consider to whom these principles apply, 
something which Rawls termed the ‘subject’ of justice.4 For 
Rawls, the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of soci-
ety—the major political, social and economic institutions, which 
act as public regulatory structures. Rawls focuses on the justness 
or unjustness of institutions or social systems, rather than the 
actions of individuals. Indeed, Rawls ‘does not consider justice as 
a personal virtue, but the first virtue of social institutions’11; the 
principles of justice should not be applied to personal conduct, 
but to the rules which constitute the basic institutions. We thus 
argue that the principles to guide a just healthcare system (as 
outlined in figure 1) do not apply to the individual actions of 
those working within or using the NHS, but to the structures 
which make up the health service itself. As such, the principles 
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do not necessarily provide specific guidance on how individual 
issues should be managed; they provide broader guidance on 
how a just health service should be constructed and maintained.
The focus of Rawls’ Theory of Justice on institutions, as 
opposed to individuals, can make it challenging to implement in 
practice. As Shevory has noted, Rawls’ work ‘is highly abstract 
and leaves to others the task of matching real- world circumstances 
to ethical principles consistent with the overall theory’.7 Rawls 
relies on an abstracted veil of ignorance to develop principles 
which should be applied to the institutions in order to produce 
a just system in ideal circumstances. It is not always clear how 
actual agents, who exist in non- ideal conditions, should use his 
principles to guide the regulation of existing institutions.
Perhaps the most pressing question for us, then, is how a 
Rawlsian approach can be applied in practice to guide policy and 
resolve conflicts within the existing NHS. Individuals who make 
healthcare policy decisions need the above principles, and guid-
ance on how to practically apply them to existing institutions to 
make the system more just. To do this, we combine Rawls with 
elements of Scanlonian contractualism.
SCANLONIAN CONTRACTUALISM
Scanlon argued that just principles could be derived from debate 
between individuals who are motivated by a desire for reason-
able agreement, acting in a way which others could not ‘reason-
ably reject’12 (in contrast with Rawls’ ideal of finding principles 
which everyone would agree to). The agents in Scanlon’s model 
are aware of their self- interests and position in society. They 
wish to justify themselves to others (who have their own inter-
ests to pursue); if an action can be reasonably rejected by those 
affected by it, by Scanlon’s definition, it is wrong. This theory 
thus appeals to the normative notion of reasonableness to 
produce a theory of interpersonal obligations, focusing on what 
we owe to each other.
Why, then, should we not simply rely on Scanlonian contrac-
tualism as a way of developing just principles for a health-
care service? We argue that there are several key advantages 
to applying a Rawlsian approach to consensus building and 
reasonableness.
One issue with Scanlon’s approach is that any individual group 
can only represent their current interests—it does not lend itself 
as well to intergenerational conflicts, as only the views of current 
persons are considered. Some have argued that Scanlonian 
contractualism can be extended to consider the rights of future 
persons, as ‘the fact that future people do not co- exist with us…
does not prevent us from hypothetically contracting with them by 
considering them among those to whom we have reason to justify 
principles’.13 We could thus ask whether future people could 
reasonably reject the principle when considering the morality of 
an action. Overall, however, Rawlsian justice has been applied 
to intergenerational conflict more widely, and more compel-
lingly, than Scanlonian contractualism has.14 15 Problems where 
the rights of current users must be balanced with future users 
of a healthcare system are more convincingly addressed using 
a Rawlsian approach, which explicitly considers the issue of 
sustainability through discussions of how just institutions should 
be maintained across time. Applying Rawls’ just savings prin-
ciple would, for example, provide justification for research and 
innovation in the NHS to improve the service provided to future 
generations, even if there is some cost to current generations.
A further problem is that Scanlonian contractualism aims to 
produce a general moral theory to determine what we owe to 
each other, but does not defend any substantive principles of 
distributive justice. Scanlon aims to develop ‘principles of right 
and wrong for individual actions in such a way that the interests 
of each affected person are taken fairly into account’,16 while 
Rawls focuses on the basic institutions and aims to develop prin-
ciples which, if followed, would result in a just society. In this 
sense, Scanlonian contractualism might be helpful in guiding 
reasoning about specific individual healthcare decisions (and has 
already been suggested to guide decision- making around; eg, 
broad- spectrum vs narrow- spectrum antibiotic use17), but is less 
useful than a Rawlsian approach in guiding the overall devel-
opment of a just healthcare system. An example of this can be 
seen in the application of Rawls’ work to justify publicly funded 
Figure 1 Applying a Rawlsian framework to the healthcare system. NHS, National Health Service.
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universal access to healthcare, most notably by Daniels.9 Rawls’ 
Theory of Justice applies to the institutions which make up the 
basic structure of society; in this way, it can be of help in justi-
fying universal access to healthcare in a way that Scanlon’s work, 
focused as it is on interactions between individuals, cannot.
A PRACTICAL SOLUTION: COMBINING SCANLONIAN 
CONTRACTUALISM WITH A RAWLSIAN APPROACH
We have shown that relying purely on the work of either Rawls 
or Scanlon alone would not provide a practically useful frame-
work to guide policy. Rawls’ Theory of Justice relies significantly 
on the hypothetical veil of ignorance; the principles derived 
from it could be applied to the institutions making up a health-
care system, but can be difficult for policymakers working within 
existing institutions to enact. Scanlon’s concept of self- interested 
contemporaneous agents debating principles is more practically 
applicable as it does not demand the veil of ignorance, but it 
is overly focused on what individuals owe each other. Conse-
quently, it does not provide as compelling an account of how 
to create a healthcare system which is just to current and future 
generations.
We thus propose a method of implementing an adapted Rawl-
sian approach for the NHS by combining it with some elements 
of Scanlonian contractualism, as demonstrated in figure 2. 
Scanlonian contractualism could initially be used: a committee 
of healthcare workers, patients, relatives and managers could 
come together as themselves and represent their own interests, 
contemporaneously discussing how different policies might 
impact on them (with a reminder to consider from present and 
future positions). To ensure that those less able to represent 
themselves (or at all) were represented, additional independent 
advocates would be appointed to participate in the process. 
Scanlon refers to this as the ‘trustee model’, in which objections 
to certain principles could be raised by ‘trustees’ representing 
those who themselves lack the capacity to assess reasons and 
express objections (eg, infants or the cognitively impaired).12
In this way, Scanlonian contractualism would elucidate the 
impact of actions on different stakeholders, as assessing ‘the 
comparative strength of individuals’ objections to various 
proposed principles will centrally involve comparing the imme-
diate and long- term gains and losses to their well- being’.18
The second step entails the committee of stakeholders explic-
itly considering if policies being considered are in keeping with 
the general principles derived from the Rawlsian approach. The 
principles themselves come from applying the ‘veil of ignorance’ 
to the healthcare service’s institutions as a whole (see figure 1); 
here they act as a checklist to be considered by the stakeholders 
when making decisions or drawing up policies. This step ensures 
that each policy decision is examined to see if it meets the prin-
ciples of distributive justice, openness and sustainability.
We recognise, of course, that there are already many exam-
ples of engaging with patients and of ‘stakeholder involvement’. 
Several of these have gone some way towards making healthcare 
practice and policy more just: patient and public involvement 
Figure 2 A two- step process to provide a practical approach to healthcare policymaking.
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in research planning and execution; lay membership on boards; 
including multiple stakeholder perspectives in decision- making 
around healthcare rationing19 and ongoing efforts to ensure 
that individuals with a range of ethnicities and genders are 
included in many committees and groups. Citizens’ assemblies, 
such as those held in Ireland, have been convened to consider 
important policy decisions, but this has not frequently happened 
in healthcare.
While these efforts to widen representation in the decision- 
making body are laudable, it is not the same as explicitly 
requesting that different groups they have their interests consid-
ered in a Scanlonian way. Efforts to include different stake-
holders in decision- making do not generally encompass the 
‘reasonable rejection’ criteria, which we have proposed in the 
first step of our model. By demanding that decisions are made in 
a way which cannot be reasonably rejected by stakeholders, we 
ensure that their needs are considered far more robustly.
How then might this approach be embedded to help ensure 
just policies and fair practice, and how might it be applied to help 
the NHS deal flexibly with new challenges such as COVID-19?
APPLICATIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK
Preventing injustice among different socioeconomic groups
There are many recognised injustices in access to and delivery of 
healthcare across socioeconomic groups. We recognise that this 
inequity is acknowledged and periodically investigated, and that 
it is difficult to meaningfully measure whether interventions to 
change socioeconomic disparities have direct effects on health 
outcomes.20 However, our proposal will provide a stop check 
to consider whether new policies (unintentionally) worsen these 
inequities. The process of explicitly ensuring advocacy for those 
who may be less able to articulate or argue their own case will 
help make policies fairer for them (see figure 2); the check to 
ensure equity of access will help keep this at the forefront as poli-
cies are made. We recognise that, to some extent, this is already 
done: efforts are made to seek representation when new health 
services are being developed to ensure that they are accessible to 
those who need them most. But there is a distinction between 
consulting with a representative and ensuring that their view 
cannot be reasonably rejected. We argue that there is a value in 
explicitly applying the ‘difference principle’ so that if a change 
(eg, the location of a new health provider, or a new screening 
programme) disproportionately benefits one group in society, it 
benefits that group which is currently most disadvantaged.
Preventing intergenerational injustice
Currently policies are often made without explicit consideration 
of the impact on future generations. National policies are driven 
by a ‘quick return’ in reaction to the most pressing problem, and 
to ensure that voters will see the results of the actions taken and 
re- elect those in power. There is no obligation or accountability 
to consider the impact of policy decisions on future generations, 
and little incentive to do so. The strength of explicitly acknowl-
edging Rawls’ ‘just saving principle’ as part of our proposed 
framework (see figure 2), means that sustainability is considered 
more robustly. The 2015 policy of removing student grants for 
nurses, for example, led to a 30% drop in applications: in 2019 
the nursing shortage in England had increased to 40 000.21 This 
policy, which led to immediate savings but could be confidently 
predicted to result in a depleted nursing workforce, is clearly not 
in keeping with the just savings principle.
In addition to preventing short- sighted policies, our frame-
work would give voice and power to policies which involved 
proactive planning for a fairer future: recruiting staff to special-
ities or regions which were underserved, or investing in preven-
tative medicine and research to prepare for future health crises. 
The model we propose here represents the inclusion of a step to 
ensure that policies are designed to establish and preserve just 
healthcare institutions over time.
Preventing injustice in a crisis
While our proposed framework can be applied to deal with chal-
lenges which we are already aware of, it becomes even more 
useful when an unexpected challenge arises. Instead of having 
to start from first principles, an established method of reasoning 
and a set of accepted principles can be drawn on. This would 
have been invaluable in approaching the COVID-19 pandemic.
Radical changes had to be made to the health service in light 
of COVID-19, and many of the decisions necessitated balancing 
conflicting needs from different users. We suggest that a funda-
mental problem in the response to the crisis was the lack of clear 
philosophical framework or just decision- making process. Of 
note, the UK government’s Moral and Ethical Advice Group 
met, but only very brief notes were published: in them, there 
was no reference to a process by which decisions were consid-
ered, nor of the use of philosophical principles.22 This lack of 
coherent ethical framework guiding policy decisions was evident 
in the—at times—narrowly focused and frantic attempts to 
restructure services.
At the beginning of the pandemic in the UK there was a 
fear—based on experiences in Italy—that there would be an 
insufficient number of ventilators. Significant attention was thus 
bestowed on the demands of the most critically ill: the nightin-
gale hospitals were built at pace, and multiple ventilator projects 
were spawned. Those in care homes and in primary care were, 
certainly in the early stages of the response, overlooked. Vulner-
able patients were discharged back to nursing homes where they 
may have spread disease, while primary care and care home staff 
were left with insufficient personal protective equipment.
Had our framework been used, nursing home residents and 
staff would have reasonably rejected these policies. The needs 
of patients without COVID-19 might also have been recognised 
earlier had their voice (or that of their ‘trustee’) been included 
in debates. Suspending cancer screening services or cancelling 
urgent surgeries might have been reasonably rejected by those 
who needed this care. The requirement for sustainability would 
also have encouraged policymakers to think about developing 
alternative streams for these patients, away from COVID-19 
admission units, rather than putting off the problem for a future 
date. Finally, those working within the health service were often 
given little opportunity to challenge policies or contribute to 
decision- making: the principle of openness was not adhered to, 
and the resulting decisions were weaker as a result.
A full exploration of exactly what policies might have been 
adopted using our suggested framework is beyond the scope 
of this essay; we would instead like to highlight that the way 
some decisions were made did not afford adequate consider-
ation to how they would impact a range of health service users 
and workers—both present and future—including those without 
COVID-19 and those in primary care or care homes. Had the 
proposed framework been in place, then the impact of policies 
on all stakeholders would have been fairly considered, including 
minority groups and the most vulnerable in society. An explicit 
consideration of the principles of distributive justice, open-
ness and sustainability could have provided an ethical basis for 
guiding policy made in response to the challenges of COVID-19.
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CONCLUSION
We propose that attempts to help individual doctors practise 
fairly and justly throughout their professional lives are best 
focused at an institutional or systemic level. At the moment, indi-
vidual clinicians face moral discomfort as they make decisions 
within a healthcare system which is at times unfair: they refer a 
patient to their local hospital knowing it is less well resourced 
than the one 100 miles away; they work with colleagues whose 
training has been compromised and whose pay is inadequate; 
they discharge patients who are potentially transmitting infec-
tious diseases back to care homes to make way for more acutely 
sick patients.
Establishing guidance that will help doctors negotiate specific 
cases of injustice is challenging: every situation is different. 
Moreover, while individual policies to address each injustice 
could be constructed, this would not solve the problem: more 
unexpected injustices would appear, as we have unfortunately 
just witnessed.
We recognise that implementing a philosophical framework 
to guide just healthcare policy would not suddenly remove all 
unfairness in the system, and doctors would still sometimes find 
themselves in situations where their actions might seem unfair 
to current or future users of the health service. Yet by intro-
ducing a just process for policymaking, clinicians would less 
frequently find themselves in such situations. If clinicians were 
confident that the policies being made were based on a consis-
tent and robust ethical framework—and one which was open 
to engagement and challenge—then their individual decisions 
would become less morally challenging.
At the moment, there is a striking absence of an underlying 
philosophical framework on which healthcare policy decisions 
within the NHS are made. This has resulted in a system which 
is not always just in its resolution of conflicting demands from 
different users, current or future. We have proposed a practical 
framework—a transparent Scanlonian process and a set of prin-
ciples derived from Rawls (as depicted in figures 1 and 2)—on 
which the development of health policy could be based, and 
which could be drawn on as new challenges arise. Having a clear 
process for the development of healthcare policy, based on phil-
osophical principles and designed to be used in practice, could 
help make the NHS fairer to all of its users. Adopting this frame-
work would equip the workforce and population to contribute 
to fair policymaking, and would ultimately result in a healthcare 
system whose practice and policies—at their core—were just.
Twitter Zoe Fritz @drzoefritz
Acknowledgements We would like to thank Melissa Lane and Gabriele Badano 
for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.
Contributors ZF and CLC contributed equally to this work. They conceived 
and discussed the ideas together, and the final work is the result of their close 
collaboration.
Funding ZF is funded by the Wellcome Trust (grant number 208213/Z/17/Z).
Competing interests None declared.
Patient consent for publication Not required.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.
Open access This is an open access article distributed in accordance with the 
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Unported (CC BY 4.0) license, which permits 
others to copy, redistribute, remix, transform and build upon this work for any 
purpose, provided the original work is properly cited, a link to the licence is given, 
and indication of whether changes were made. See: https:// creativecommons. org/ 
licenses/ by/ 4. 0/.
ORCID iDs
Zoe Fritz http:// orcid. org/ 0000- 0001- 9403- 409X
Caitríona L Cox http:// orcid. org/ 0000- 0001- 9416- 9509
REFERENCES
 1 Oldham J. Reform reform: an essay by John Oldham. BMJ 2013;347:f6716.
 2 GMC. Good medical practice 2013.
 3 Sokol DK. "Make the care of your patient your first concern". BMJ 2011;342(feb02 
2).
 4 Rawls J. A theory of justice. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1971.
 5 Rawls J. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
 6 Rawls J, Kelly E. Justice as fairness : a restatement. Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2001.
 7 Shevory TC. Applying Rawls to medical cases: an investigation into the usages of 
analytical philosophy. J Health Polit Policy Law 1986;10(4):749–64.
 8 Fritz Z, Cox C. Conflicting demands on a modern healthcare service: can Rawlsian 
justice provide a guiding philosophy for the NHS and other socialized health services? 
Bioethics 2019;33(5):609–16.
 9 Daniels N. Just health care. Cambridge University Press, 1985.
 10 Badano G. If you’re a Rawlsian, how come you’re so close to Utilitarianism and 
Intuitionism? A critique of Daniels’s accountability for Reasonableness. Health Care 
Anal 2018;26(1):1–16.
 11 Pilapil RD. From institutions to persons? Rawls and the subject of justice. Journal of 
Human Values 2018;24(3):166–73.
 12 Scanlon T. What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press, 1998.
 13 Finneron- Burns E. Contractualism and the non- identity problem. Ethic Theory Moral 
Prac 2016;19(5):1151–63.
 14 Gaspart F, Gosseries A. Are generational savings unjust? Politics, Philosophy & 
Economics 2007;6(2):193–217.
 15 Gosseries A. Theories of intergenerational justice: a synopsis. SAPIENS 2008;11.
 16 Adams RM. Critical notice of T M. Scanlon, what we owe to each other. Philos Rev 
2001;110:563–86.
 17 Millar M. Constraining the use of antibiotics: applying Scanlon’s contractualism. J Med 
Ethics 2012;38(8):465–9.
 18 Ashford E. The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism 2003;113:273–302.
 19 Singer PA, Martin DK, Giacomini M, et al. Priority setting for new technologies in 
medicine: qualitative case study. BMJ 2000;321(7272):1316–8.
 20 Independent inquiry into inequalities in health report. Available: https:// assets. 
publishing. service. gov. uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/ attachment_ data/ file/ 
265503/ ih. pdf
 21 Funding constraints and workforce shortages jeopardising five year forward view 
delivery, says health Foundation. Available: https://www. health. org. uk/ press- release/ 
funding- constraints- and- workforce- shortages- jeopardising- five- year- forward- view
 22 Moral and ethical Advisory group. Available: https://www. gov. uk/ government/ groups/ 
moral- and- ethical- advisory- group# meeting- summaries
